The most important management concept needing alignment with the demands of the Army profession is career progression.
-The Future of the Army Profession 2005 1 This conclusion, reached in successive reviews of the Army profession, is unambiguous. Numerous other studies, conducted by the Army and by leading think tanks, have reached similar results. This research specifically highlights the need for greater attention to strategic leader development. 2 Therefore, this deduction raises a couple of key questions. What key competencies should our strategic leaders possess?
How can the Army better develop these key strategic competencies?
In addressing these questions, I will first establish the key strategic leader competencies required for the contemporary national security environment. Second, I
will look at existing officer development and progression to determine how they shape the building of these competencies. The line of inquiry will then consider recent reviews on the topic to identify relevant conclusions that might inform areas for improvement.
Finally, I will propose recommendations for change.
The officer career management system has been described as a set of -four interrelated personnel functions -accessing, developing, promoting, and transitioning.‖ 3 In examining how we might better build key strategic leader competencies, this work will focus primarily on development and promotions within the larger context of officer progression. It will not consider access function whose goal is to provide officers with the basic intellectual, moral, and physical foundations required to begin building tactical, not strategic, competencies. The transition function, which frames career lengths and how long competencies are used, similarly lies outside the range of this investigation.
In addition to concentrating on development and progression, the scope of inquiry will concentrate specifically on those in the operations career field, or line officers, in the ranks of captain (O-3) through lieutenant colonel (O-5) for several reasons. First, the Army's general officers are overwhelmingly, though not exclusively, selected from those in this career field. Thus, changes to the development of this group of officers offer the greatest possible impact on strategic leadership. Second, although the development of strategic competencies does not begin at captain nor end at lieutenant colonel, it is concentrated there. Key formative time spent as a lieutenant (currently the first 38 months) has as its goal the development of basic leadership and tactical competencies. At the other end, once an officer is promoted to colonel and above he or she begins to become individually managed based on the level of development accumulated. The concern becomes more the management of talent rather than its development. Therefore, the window from captain to lieutenant colonel presents the best opportunity to affect the development of key strategic competencies.
Determining what those requirements are is the first step.
Key Strategic Leader Competencies
Retired General and Former Secretary of State Powell is certainly no stranger to strategic leadership. His statement, to a cohort of future strategic leaders, provides the central underlying assumption from which to identify key strategic leader competencies:
most of my time…was spent outside, looking outside sensing political opportunity, sensing strategic opportunity, measuring risk, assessing new challenges…as you become more senior you have to get outside the pyramid in order to do your job effectively.
Competencies include the -knowledge, skills, attributes, and capacities‖ required to accomplish requirements. 5 The foundation that allows strategic leaders to operate effectively outside their organizations is the understanding of the broader environment.
They also need the tools to persuade or influence a range of actors within that setting.
Therefore, this section will assert that three key competencies of the strategic leader are strategic context, broad influence, and communications skills.
I do not assert that these three competencies are the only strategic competencies required. Although key, the strategic leader requires other competencies such as the ability to exercise good judgment, to provide vision, and to build teams. Developing the context that allows the strategic leader to operate effectively outside his organization is key because it impacts many other strategic leader competencies. Significantly, this broad frame of reference is critical in a strategic leader's ability to understand the alternative perspectives of external actors, in a wordempathize. Empathy in turn is a significant component in successful negotiation. 7 A strategic leader, who has operated exclusively at the tactical level, has a very narrow frame of reference to draw on when he finds himself negotiating with joint partners or other governmental agencies. This leader might be one of a handful that can -pick it up quickly‖ or develop that strategic context on the job. However, a deliberate effort to develop strategic context also has the added benefit of helping to develop a second critical competency -broad influence.
The Army Leadership manual, FM 6-22, states that leaders need to be able to extend influence -inside and outside the traditional lines of authority.‖ 8 This broad influence comes from two sources, position power and personal power. Position power is typically exercised in and is most effective within an organization. It is power in its most formal form: the ability to reward, punish, and influence by virtue of the leader's role. 9 Personal power, on the other hand, is much more common outside the boundaries of the organization or hierarchy. This type of power is more informal and less overt. It includes referent and expert power. 10 A leader has referent power when people like, identify with, or see that leader as a role model. Expert power comes from a recognized level of knowledge or competence -either in relation to the perceiver or against an established standard.
Strategic leaders require broad influence in order to operate effectively in a variety of environments. In particular, personal power is more familiar in less hierarchical surroundings such as governmental organizations outside the DoD, academia, and think tanks. Referent power coming from a -feeling of oneness‖ enables the leader to build and sustain relationships in these settings. 11 In considering expert power, it is the competence and credibility of the leader that matters. Expert power also depends on the effectiveness of the leader's information or communication skills. 12 The leader that has the strategic context to understand the environment and broad influence to affect it cannot persuade his or her intended audience without the corresponding communications skills. Communications skills include deciding who to influence, how to influence them, delivering the message through words and actions, and assessing the effectiveness of this effort. Therefore, senior leader communications involve aspects of both art and science. 13 Often referred to as strategic communications, the ability to communicate at the strategic level differs in significant ways from communicating at lower levels. Because the audience frequently lies outside the leader's organization, they are much more removed from the speaker -reducing the frequency of interaction, attention span, and familiarity with the topic. This places a premium on persuasiveness, brevity, and clarity. 14 Leaders at the strategic level, operating outside of their organizations, must become even more effective at two-way communication or dialogue. Dialogue provides a venue for both advocacy and inquiry. 15 The two-way exchange of information and ideas enhances a shared understanding of complex problems with long planning horizons that in turn shapes the exercise of power at the strategic level. Through dialogue, the frames of reference of the involved actors are refined. Strategic leaders also gain the forum for exercising referent and expert power to influence and persuade.
In much the same way that strategic context enhanced empathy which impacts the ability to negotiate; communications skill, in particular dialogue, promotes consensus and team-building. 
Officer Development and Officer Progression
The Officer Professional Management System (OPMS) is the structure in which the four functions of accessing, developing, promoting, and transitioning occur. Within this construct, DA PAM 600-3 serves as the primary -professional development guide for all officers.‖ 16 Therefore, this section will begin by reviewing the professional development objectives, approaches, and resources described in DA PAM 600-3. Next it will look at how professional development is shaped by the current officer progression model. This will provide some conclusions about how well development and career progression build strategic leader competencies.
According to DA PAM 600-3, officer development should focus on the -quality and range of experience, rather than the specific gates or assignments required to progress.‖ 17 It seeks to do this broadly through the domains of operational experiences, institutional training and education, and self-development. An overview of each of these areas will lead to a view of the officer progression model. 25 The key aspects of this include promotion zones based on seniority, limiting the percentage of officers promoted below the zone, allowing officers one opportunity per grade to be in a promotion zone, allowing officers above the zone to remain eligible for promotion, and requiring separation of captains and majors who twice fail selection for promotion. 26 However, it is Department of Defense policy, -based on congressional intent conveyed in the House and Senate reports accompanying the DOPMA legislation,‖ that establishes promotion points.
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Promotion points occur at 10 years of service for majors, 16 years for lieutenant colonels, and 22 years for colonels with variance of a year on either side of these to allow for below the zone and above the zone promotions.
Assignments and PME are -linked to promotions, future assignments, and career management models for all officers.‖ 28 Therefore, the timing of promotions affects development. Overlaying the various assignment, military education, and promotion timelines produces a view of the officer career progression model below. the goal of quality and range of experience but is driven by time. 29 Requirements for length of experience in KD positions and fixed promotion points drive personnel managers and the officers they manage. Second, development is overwhelmingly focused on tactical and operational competencies. 30 By the time an officer is a colonel with 22 years of service, he or she will have had a maximum of 4 opportunities for a two-year broadening assignment. This is only the case if the officer's career has been managed optimally to allow the maximum number of opportunities and the officer is never promoted below the zone. Those promoted two or three times below the zone will certainly have less of these opportunities. Further, these -broadening‖ assignments may be anything but. An examination of developmental assignments listed in DA PAM 600-3
for captains through lieutenant colonels shows that as many as 40% to 60% are at the tactical level or are operational in nature, such as tactics instructor or trainers. 31 As a result, officer development and career progression are optimized to build tactical, operational excellence.
Building tactical and operational excellence is vitally important. It is what has made our military the preeminent fighting force it is in the world today. However, developing strategic leader competencies is not antithetical to tactical superiority. The central problem is to build those competencies in such a way that we maintain our tactical and operational dominance. Several studies of officer development provide an opportunity to assess possible areas for change.
Major Studies and Reviews
This section will look at five influential reviews from a variety of sources and focus on the relevant conclusions and recommendations related to officer development and career progression. Recommendations from the RETAL study ranged from pre-commissioning through General officer. Three of these fall within the parameters of this research project. It recommended that the Army create Leader Development Assignment Panels.
These panels, consisting of colonels from the field, would identify and send captains and majors finishing their KD assignments to developmental assignments such as civilian graduate schools and internships. 37 Another recommendation was to identify officers most likely to command battalions and to send them to advanced civil schooling followed by a liberally interpreted utilization tour, follow-on KD positions, or a joint assignment. The third recommendation was to create JIIM internships to which the Leader Development Assignment Panels would also assign officers.
The Officer Corps Strategy Series monograph on developing talent was the fifth in a series of six. This particular study began with the observation that the current Army development system -shunts its officers down conventional career paths and through standardized ‗gates'.‖ 38 Drawing on tenets of human capital theory, the monograph emphasized the importance of properly valued signals and continuing education to affect the climate of development in the Army. 39 Properly valued signals include credentialing, such as obtaining a degree. Credentials communicate value because they indicate a level of sacrifice required to obtain them, and capabilities possessed. 40 The monograph recommended increasing the number of graduate school opportunities, noting that these had fallen from 7,000 slots a year in the mid-1980s to fewer than 400 a year by the early 1990s. 41 43 The authors' overarching recommendation was to move from a time-based to a competency-based system. To achieve this, they first Several recommendations bear particular consideration here. First, the study recommends that the services allow for greater career flexibility. This would come in the form of sabbatical years which could be used to obtain graduate education or work in unconventional assignments, such as with industry. 47 Added benefits of this sabbatical include greater flexibility in tending to family or personal needs. It also argues for increasing JIIM opportunities and making them available earlier in an officer's career.
Other noteworthy recommendations include enhancing officer education in and out of the formal education systems, and increasing education and training in strategic communications, as well as in linguistic and cultural knowledge. In addition to enhancing cognitive abilities, the conclusion states that -the most important factor in ensuring that the profession of arms is able to meet the demands of national security in this century will be the people selected to lead the services.‖ This could take the form of signals or those things that are recorded in official files, and therefore given importance, but should be validated through changes in who gets promoted. Finally, the military should consider changes at a number of levels -from revising DA PAM 600-3 to recommending changes to DoD policy and even working with
Congress to change how law is written. This paper will now offer some recommendations on specific actions the Army can take to increase the development of the key strategic leader competencies.
Recommendations
This section will begin by demonstrating how a few changes in the developmental areas of experience, education, and training have the potential to advance the key strategic competencies of strategic context, broad influence, and communications skills. The most significant changes center on exposure to broadening and strategic level assignments, a quality civilian education, and expanding communications training. Moving from the general to the specific, this section will then recommend concrete steps that we can take to facilitate these changes within the context of officer development and progression -specifically by considering how to provide increased opportunity and increased incentive.
Not all developmental assignments are equal. Exposure to broadening and strategic level experiences provides the opportunity to develop strategic competencies.
These assignments might be strategic through association, such as an aide for a strategic leader; or echelon, such as working in the Pentagon or as an intern with the Department of State. Multiple assignments along these lines increase strategic context and expose an officer earlier and more often to people outside of their organization. It has the added benefit, in an era of multiple deployments, of providing an operational heartbeat to the leader and his family. Achieving these and other changes will require opportunity and incentive.
Opportunity comes from creating flexibility and time. Given officer development and the officer progression model, increasing opportunity can come from a couple approachesreducing requirements or lengthening the time between promotion points.
Maintaining tactical and operational excellence is essential, so reducing requirements is problematic. However there is some opportunity for improvement here. The Army Officer Record Brief (ORB) is a comprehensive snapshot of an officer's skills, education, and experiences updated frequently and used by personnel managers and promotion boards. 54 Among the information contained on the ORB, Section VI lists military education and section VII civilian education. By separating these two types of education, there is an embedded mechanism that differentiates the nature and importance of the two. 55 However, the largest section, Section IX consists of assignment information that is simply detailed chronologically from oldest to newest.
The Army should revise Section IX (Assignment Information) of the ORB into two categories -tactical/operational and strategic/broadening. This would more effectively communicate both the depth and breadth of an officer's assignments. It would also send a signal about the importance of broadening/strategic assignments to the officer and to promotion boards. In providing the opportunity and incentive to pursue advanced degrees and broadening assignments, there are several things to keep in mind. First, high promotion rates at lower ranks will temper attempts to incentivize the development of strategic leader competencies. Second, the Army does not need all officers in a cohort to develop into strategic leaders. However, the Army does require that its colonels possess the key strategic leader competencies to provide strategic leadership. Therefore, the Army should require a graduate degree and the completion of two broadening, strategic assignments for promotion to colonel. By placing this dual requirement at the colonel level, the Army can ensure that it is providing both the time and motivation to develop strategic leader competencies steadily over a 20 year period. Along with adding flexibility between promotions, it begins to evolve career progression towards a competency-based system.
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Conclusion
The following quote by General George C. Marshall reminds us that strategic leadership requires a different set of competencies.
It became clear to me that at the age of 58, I would have to learn new tricks that were not taught in the military manuals or on the battlefield…to learn the arts of persuasion and guile. I must become an expert in a whole new set of skills. 58 This study looked at how to build these competencies into officer development and progression. It focused on Army officers in the operational career field between the rank of captain and lieutenant colonel. However, many of the conclusions and recommendations are arguably as appropriate for other career fields and other services.
This paper began by identifying key leader competencies required at the strategic level -strategic context, broad influence, and communications skills. Next, it looked at officer development and officer progression to assess its impact on building these strategic leader competencies. It concluded that officer development is unable to achieve its stated goals due to time constraints, and it focuses overwhelmingly on tactical and operational competencies.
With this assessment, the inquiry turned to identifying areas for change and developing recommendations. A broad survey of recent reviews on officer development, conducted in and out of the Army, showed that the current system fails to provide the opportunity or incentive to develop strategic leader competencies. The paper argues that increasing access to broadening or strategic assignments, greater opportunity for civilian graduate education, and communications training have the greatest impact in developing key strategic leader competencies. Further, several specific recommendations looked to increase both the time available and the motivation to pursue these means of development.
In the process, this document has touched on some of the more salient and thorny obstacles to change. The availability of mid-grade officers, revision to DoD policy, and changes to law is considerable. It also looked at culture and climate,
indirectly by considering signals and the value of what gets recorded; and directly, by changes to the requirements for who gets promoted.
At the center of this analysis is the belief that the Army must maintain its tactical and operational superiority, and it does not need all officers to become strategic leaders. However, it must provide both the opportunity and incentive to develop strategic leader competencies soundly over time for those who will lead the Army at the highest levels. Developing strategic leaders and not just leaders that can operate at the strategic level is too important to leave to on the job training.
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